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 Government 
failure, 
opposition 
success? 
Electoral 
performance in 
Portugal and 
Italy at the time 
of the crisis 
 
by Enrico Borghetto, Elisabetta De Giorgi, 
Marco Lisi1 
 
Abstract 
 
The costs of the crisis in Southern European 
countries have not been only economic but 
political. Economic crises tend to lead to 
government instability and terminat
political challengers are expected to exploit 
this contingent window of opportunity to gain 
an advantage over incumbents in national 
elections. The current crisis seems to make no 
exception, looking at the results of the general 
elections recently held in Southern Europe. 
However, this did not always lead to 
victory of the main opposition parties. In most 
                                                 
1
 This paper is the result of the collective effort of the 
three authors. Nonetheless, Elisabetta De Giorgi
particularly responsible for the first section of the article, 
Marco Lisi for the second section and Enrico Borghetto 
for the third. 
ion while 
a clear 
 is 
of the elections, in fact, the incumbent parties’ 
loss did not coincide with the official 
opposition’s gain. The extreme case is 
represented by Italy, where 
government coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi 
– setting aside for the moment
phase – and its main challenger, the centre left 
coalition, ended up losing millions of voters
and a new political force, t
Movement, obtained about 25 per cent of votes. 
On the opposite side there is Portugal. Only in 
Portugal did the vote increase for the cen
right PSD, in fact, exceed
socialists’ loss. The present
exploring the factors which might account for 
this significant divergence between the two 
cases.  
 
Introduction 
 
The economic and financial crisis has taken its 
toll on all the Southern European countries. 
Arguably, the costs have not been on
economic but also political
are by their nature unpopular and so is the 
government that has to implement them. 
Political challengers are expected to exploit 
this contingent window of opportunity to gain 
an advantage over incumbents i
elections. This is consistent with the literature 
on economic voting: economic and financial 
crises tend to coincide with a decline in the 
incumbent’s popularity a
the polls (Lewis-Beck 1988). If we look at the 
results of the general elections held in the last 
three years in Southern Europe, the current 
crisis seems to make no exception
which had to implement austerity 
reconfirmed in office. 
                                                
2
 A recent comparative analysis by Lewis
Nadeau (2012) found out that the impact of economic 
voting in the last three decades have been even stronger 
in countries of Southern rather than Northern Europe. 
 
4 
both the outgoing 
 the technocratic 
 
he Five Star 
tre 
 the incumbent 
 work aims at 
ly 
. Austerity measures 
n national 
nd its punishment at 
2
. No cabinet 
has been 
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 That said, models of economic voting
of global crisis seem to be better at
the fate of incumbents than the reasons driving 
voters to reward a specific challenger. In fact, 
the punishment of incumbents has not
been accompanied by a clear victory for
main opposition parties. Rather, in most
crisis leads to “the growth of abstention, 
increasing parliamentary fragmentation and the 
emergence of new political forces, notably 
those expressing anti-party, extreme right
or even racist positions”3. 
represent a conundrum for a rigid economic
voting understanding of election dynamics, 
whereby voters tend to reward those parties 
that are perceived as the most 
managing the nation’s economy. 
In this regard, the Italian 2013 election 
paradigmatic. Both the outgoing 
coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi 
aside for the moment  the technocratic phase 
led by Mario Monti – and its main challenger, 
the centre left coalition, ended up losing 
millions of voters. On the other hand, in the 
midst of one of the worst economic recession
in recent decades, a political force without any 
previous parliamentary experience, the 
Star Movement (M5S), led by the Italian 
comedian and blogger Beppe Grillo, 
about 25 per cent of votes. On the opposite side 
of the spectrum there is Portugal. Only in 
Portugal did the vote increase f
right PSD exceed the incumbent socialists’ loss 
at the general election held in 2011, which 
followed the socialist Prime Minister’s 
resignation and the bailout signed with 
European Commission (EC), 
Central Bank (ECB) and the 
Monetary Fund (IMF). What is more, the vote 
                                                 
3
 Bosco, A. and Verney, S. (2012) Electoral Epidemic: 
The Political Cost of Economic Crisis in Southern 
Europe, 2010-11, South European Society and Politics
17(2), p.150. 
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of protest directed to alternative parties has, if 
anything, shrunk. 
This work aims at contributing to the debate on 
the effect of the current economic crisis on 
national election results by exploring the 
factors which might account for such a 
remarkable divergence between 
Portugal. Given a number of significantly 
similar conditions in which the elections took 
place, the main question to answer is: what 
factors drove Portuguese and Italian voters to 
react to economic concerns in such a different 
way? The empirical analysis focuses on factors 
at the level of: the economic and political 
context preceding the two elections
respectively held in 2011 and 2013
electoral campaign; the electoral offer and
voters’ behaviour in both countries.
 
The economic and political context
 
Italy and Portugal are two of the European 
countries that were most
international economic crisis 
2007. They are also two of the Southern 
European countries whose name supplied the 
first two letters of the
P.I.G.S. for Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain
These countries actually share some political 
and economic features. T
characterised by weak "institutionalised party 
systems, whose electorates nevertheless show 
restricted electoral volatility, along with 
ideological voting and extended political 
patronage. On the economic side, their 
structures appear weaker than their Northern 
European counterparts, with uneven economic 
developments typical of dual economies, large 
state economic involvement and reduced social 
                                                
4
 The “I” refers to Italy, but it has also been linked to 
Ireland, which started to share with these countries the 
same economic difficulties. 
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 mobility"5. In recent years, th
features led to nearly the same political and 
economic consequences: all four countries 
were hit by a dramatic financial crisis and had 
to face a period of serious political instability. 
Nevertheless, besides these general similarities, 
they show significant differences, which might 
help us to understand the reasons of the 
extremely different electoral outcomes
observed in both countries. 
 
Short term dynamics 
Starting from the most recent political fact
the first factor to consider is the timing of the 
elections and the political events which 
immediately preceded them. In 2011 
Portuguese and Italian Prime Minister
resigned, leading to a government 
their eventual replacement. This outcome was 
reached in two different ways though. On the 
one hand, a new general election was 
immediately called in Portugal (June 2011) 
while in Italy, a new parliamentary majority 
decided to support a technocratic government 
(November 2011), without going to the polls.
Portuguese voters behaved consistently with 
the predictions of economic voting theories: in 
times of crisis voters are apt to “punish 
incumbent parties either by voting for the 
opposition or abstaining”6. After the rejection 
of an austerity package – the fourth in le
one year – by the parliament, the Socialist PM 
José Sócrates decided to resign and the 
international lenders were called to the rescue 
in April 2011. A bailout was signed by the 
three major parties – the Socialist Party (PS), 
the PSD and the CDS-PP – with the strong 
opposition of the radical left parties 
                                                 
5
 Bellucci, P., Costa Lobo, M., Lewis-Beck, M.S. (2012) 
Economic crisis and elections: The European pe
Electoral Studies, 31, p.470. 
6
 Scotto, T. J. (2012) Conclusion: Thinking about 
models of economic voting in hard times, 
Studies, 31, p.529. 
ese common 
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ss than 
– the 
riphery, 
Electoral 
Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), the 
Greens (PEV) and the Left Block (BE). 
Following this, in June 2011, the centre right 
PSD and the right wing CDS 
absolute majority at the gener
Portugal was the only S
country hit by crisis in which the incumbent’s 
loss corresponded almost
opposition’s gain. 
 
The situation in Italy was different. First of all, 
the resignation of the PM Silvio
was due not to a negative or no
vote in parliament, but to a political 
compromise mainly inspired by 
European partners and diplomatically managed 
by the President of the Republic, Giorgio 
Napolitano. The European institutions
crucial role in supporting the emergence of a 
large parliamentary consensus both 
formation of a new government
former EU Commissioner Mario Monti,
the adoption of economic 
could help to overcome the critical
problems. As a result, Italy did not opt for
immediate fresh election
for the replacement of the government in office 
with a technocratic executive
government lasted until December 2012
general election was held in February 2013. In 
this case, beside the dramatic growth of 
abstentions, as predicted by 
Verney7, it was mainly the anti
that precipitated the fall of both the centre right 
and centre left coalition –
in government since the mid
which helped the astonishing success
Five Star Movement. In addition, no 
majority emerged in parliament (
Senate), with the consequent difficulty of 
appointing a new government in a short t
                                                
7
 Bosco and Varney, 2012. 
8
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 After the re-appointment of Mr. Napolitano as 
President of the Republic –
unexpected but somehow inevitable effect of 
the political chaos which followed the general 
election – the only government 
formed was one supported by a 
coalition, composed of the traditional political 
adversaries of the Second republic 
left Democratic Party (PD) and the centre right
Popolo delle Libertà (PDL) – and the 
Civica led by Mario Monti. 
 
All in all, the first crucial difference between 
the Portuguese and the Italian case 
decision they took on the dilemma facing them 
of whether to call or postpone a new election
after the resignation of their respective prime 
ministers in 2011. While the immediate
election in Portugal allowed the voters to 
assign a clear responsibility of the economic 
crisis to the incumbent PS, the long 
technocratic parenthesis in Italy prevented the 
electorate from expressing a similarly 
judgement on the outgoing Berlusconi
coalition. The broad (and rather nebulous) 
parliamentary majority supporting the Monti 
government, together with the non
composition of the whole executive and the 
strong external pressure of European partners 
for the adoption of painful economi
measures9, made it very difficult to 
                                                                             
electoral rules which assign a majority prize to the party, 
or coalition of parties, that obtain the relative majority of 
votes at national level) was not able to negotiate an 
agreement with any of the political forces pr
parliament, in order to form a government before the 
election of the new President of the Republic, which was 
due in April 2013. According to the Constitution, until 
that election took place the two chambers could not be 
dissolved (unlike what happened in Greece,  which faced 
a similar situation in May 2012). 
9
 The growing difficulty of political parties to respond to 
voters and of voters to attribute clear responsability in 
policy terms does not originate with the global crisis, but 
well before. As asserted by Mair (2011), “at least in 
Europe, much of the policy discretion and room of 
manoeuvre open to governments has been severely 
 one further 
that could be 
grand 
– the centre 
 
new Lista 
was the 
 
 
clear 
 
-political 
c 
hold single 
esent in 
political parties accountable for government 
actions, as happened in Portugal
 
Long-term dynamics 
Beyond the most recent political and economic 
events, there are structural characteristics 
pertaining to the two systems that
contribute to the understanding of
outcomes in the electoral 
focus on the characteristics of the party system 
and the strength and composition of the 
executives. 
 
Portugal has remained a 
with at least five parties represented in 
parliament, since the first legislative election in 
1976. The four parties that 
democratic election still constitute the core of 
the Portuguese party system: the Communist 
Party (PCP), the Socialist Party (PS), the centre 
right Social Democratic Party
conservative Democratic and Social Centre 
People’s Party (CDS-PP). In between 1987 and 
2005, the effective number of parties in 
parliament10 remained quite low, 
supremacy in the Assembly 
República) of the two larger parties
PDS) which alternated in
this time we witnessed the 
smaller parties on the two 
system11. The only significant 
political scenario in the last years is 
represented by the appearance of the 
Block (BE), a radical left party 
1999 and still has a significant number of 
representatives in the Assembly. 
                                                                             
curtailed by the transfer to decision
the supranational level”. 
10
 Laakso, M. and Taagepera R. (197
Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West 
Europe, Comparative political studies
11
 Costa Lobo, M., Costa Pinto, A., Magalhães, P.  
(2012) The Political Institutions of Portuguese 
Democracies, in S. Royo (ed.), 
Century, Lanham, Lexington Books, 23
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 that, since the mid-1980s Portugal has 
remained a multiparty system characterised by 
a rather stable “effective number of 
parliamentary parties” (ENPP) with two bigger 
mainstream parties on opposite sides of the 
left-right spectrum. 2009 certainly constitutes 
crucial year in this regard. For the first time 
since 1985, in fact, the PS and PSD together 
did not reach the 70 per cent of the votes cast 
and this result was replicated in the 
election, although with a diverse outcome for 
the two parties: the PSD had to 
coalition government with the conservative 
CDS-PP. This coalition is still in office.
 
The effective number of parties in parliament 
and their increasing or declining success can 
also help explain the changes in the strength 
and composition of the 
governments.  As we said, since the mid
the ENPP has remained rather stable (and low) 
in Portugal and the PS and PSD have alternated 
in government and opposition. In 1987 and 
1991, the PSD won an absolute majority of 
seats, which allowed it to govern alone for two 
legislatures. On the other hand,
1999 the PS came in office at the head of
minority government, after failing to reach an 
absolute majority for a few seats 
winning exactly half of the seats 
Guterres resigned in 2001 and the PSD won the 
following election, without an absolute 
majority, and chose for the first time to form a 
right-wing coalition government with the CDS
PP, led by Durão Barroso. Also th
lasted less than expected, since Barroso was 
nominated President of the European 
Commission in 2003 and his successor, 
Santana Lopes, failed to complete 
In 2005, the PS obtained an absolute majority 
for the first time in its history and led the 
government until the end of the legislature
the 2009 election it lost a significant amount of 
votes, but it managed to remain in office
a 
subsequent 
agree to a 
 
Portuguese 
-1980s 
 in 1995 and 
 a 
in 1995 and 
in 1999.  PM 
-
e legislature 
his mandate. 
. In 
 at the 
head of a minority government. 
the exception of the period 2002
mainstream parties, PS and PSD, alternated in 
government and maintained their dominant 
position in the Portuguese party system from 
1987 to 2009. What is not clear yet is whether 
2009 represented the beginning of “a new party 
system realignment in Portuguese politics”
This is especially true given th
2011 election, which led to 
new coalition government with PSD and CDS
PP. What can be concluded at this stage 
the stability of the Portuguese party system in 
the last 25 years, 
concentration of votes in the two mainstream 
parties and the absence of any new credible 
competitor in recent years might be 
as one of the main factors which 
recent electoral results in times of crisis.
 
The Italian case differs from this for many 
reasons. Under the new electoral law, an 
implosion of the core of 
occurred between 1992 and 1994. This 
implosion was caused by a 
electoral losses by the established parties
judicial prosecutions (during the so called 
Tangentopoli era), party 
effects of the new majoritarian electoral 
system13. 
                                                
12
 Costa Lobo, Costa Pinto, Magalhães, 2012, p.36.
13
 In the early 1990s a pro
promoted a referendum, which was eventually held in 
June 1991,that abolished preference voting in the lo
chamber elections. The result of this referendum (it 
passed with 95 per cent of the votes) had significant 
political consequences, such that the popular vote was 
seen as a vote against the so
1993, the reformers pushed forward w
referendum, requesting the abrogation the proportional 
representation system of the Italian Senate and implicitly 
supporting its replacement by a majoritarian system that 
was expected to induce parties to coalesce around two 
main poles. This second referendum was held in April 
1993 and passed with the support of 80 per cent of the 
votes. Therefore, a real reform was introduced by the 
Parliament in 1993. Italy became a mixed system, with 
75 per cent of parliamentary seats allocated by a British 
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The 1994 election saw competition between 
many new electoral forces, some of which 
were established as a result of the breakup 
traditional parties, while 
completely new. The 1994 election was
by a centre right coalition led by Silvio 
Berlusconi. But the government lasted just 
seven months, because of the extreme 
heterogeneity of the alliance. It 
by a technocratic executive. In 1996 
competing coalitions with an identifiable 
leader – the candidate for PM 
general election, which was won by a centre 
left coalition, led by Romano Prodi. 
only the 2001 election is considered as 
watershed between the old a
political system14. For the first time, in fact, an 
incumbent government competed for power 
with an identified and clearly alternative 
opposition. This created a legitimate 
expectation of alternation between two 
different coalitions, which eventu
place. The centre right forces won the election 
and formed a new government, led by Silvio 
Berlusconi, which lasted until the end of the 
legislature. A few months before the new 
election, a new electoral law
proportional representation and party lists was 
introduced in both houses15. The 
                                                                             
style first-past-the-post electoral system and 25 per cent 
with a PR method. Beyond the electoral reform, many 
other political events occurred and contributed to radical 
changes in Italian politics in the early 1990s: above all, 
between 1992 and 1994, Italy witnessed the implosion of 
the centre parties  of the old party system. “The 
implosion of the centre parties coincided with the end of 
the double exclusion of the communist left and the 
extreme right. Suddenly all of the parties gained a 
reasonable expectation to win access to government. In 
the new political landscape a bipolar competition 
developed between two broad alliances of the left and 
right respectively” (Verzichelli and Cotta, 2000, p. 243). 
14
 Pasquino, G. (2002) “Un’elezione non come le altre”,
in G. Pasquino (ed.), Dall’Ulivo al governo Berlusconi
Bologna, Il Mulino, 11-21. 
15
 A PR system with a “majority prize” of extra seats in 
the Chamber of Deputies to the coalition obtaining a 
of 
others were 
 won 
was replaced 
two large 
– fought the 
However, 
a real 
nd the new 
ally took 
 based on 
2006 election, 
 
 
, 
fought on the basis of this law,
victory to the centre left coalition led by 
Romano Prodi. However
was so fragile that the new government 
only two years. 
 
But the bipolarisation of the party system 
reached its peak in 2008. After 
fact, Mr. Berlusconi and his party, the PDL, 
could rely on the largest political majority ever 
formed in the republican history and on a 
simplified governing coalition 
only one additional coalition partner
Northern League (LN). Furthermore, the 
parliamentary opposition was composed of 
only three parliamentary groups: the centre left 
PD, the movement Italia dei Valori
the centrist catholic party UDC. 
illusion of a “majoritarian 
rapidly dissolved by parliamentary practice and 
the persistent uncertainties of the Italian party 
system. A mix of internal problems 
main governing party (the PDL), personal 
scandals of the PM Silvio Berlusconi, political 
corruption and maladministration and, last but 
not least, the outbreak 
economic crisis, led 
resignation of the centre right 
late 2011. Following another
technocratic executive 
turmoil, the 2013 election failed to return a 
clear majority. 
 
In sum, we can say that looking at both 
short-term and long-term dynamics, although 
Portugal and Italy were 
by the financial crisis the political impact in 
each one of them was markedly different.
two countries have faced the political 
following the financial crisis in 
different ways. At the sam
                                                                             
plurality of votes at the national level, and extra seats in 
the Senate for the party obtaining a plurality of votes at 
the regional level. 
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both dramatically hit 
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events 
significantly 
e time, they show 
 remarkable differences in their 
structural characteristics such as the party 
system and the strength and composition of
executives. Both factors have in the 
and long-term certainly influenced 
behaviour in the two countries and could help 
us better understand the reasons 
different outcomes in the electoral contest
even in times of crisis. 
 
Between party decline and economic 
crisis: the road to the electio
 
Two important aspects characterised th
term dynamics that led to the electoral 
campaigns in both Italy and Portugal. The first 
was a decline in the level of government 
support, while the second is a decreasing trend 
in public confidence in political parties. 
important to look at attitudinal data in order to 
consider the impact of these fundamental 
factors on electoral results and, ultimately, on 
party system change. Our argument is that 
party crisis or decline in these two countries 
played an important role not only on political 
participation/apathy, but also on the 
punishment of the incumbents. As we will 
show in this section, there are signs of party 
failures in both countries, if we consider 
“failure” in party politics as the loss of the 
ability of political parties to build an
close links to the popular base, 
same time generating negative
towards parties in general. Our aim is to 
examine to what extent Italy and Portugal are 
distinct with regard to some indicators of party 
decline. After that, we will examine the context 
of the electoral campaigns, by analysing the 
main issues of the political debate and the 
performance of both parties and leaders.
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Political attitudes in Southern Europe: 
different trends? 
Our first indicator is the degree of 
confidence in political parties. Generally 
speaking, if we look at Southern Europe we 
find that the degree of confidence in political 
parties presents a lower average than 
rest of Western Europe.
Europe the mean for the last decade (2003
2012) is 17.7 per cent, in Western Europe the 
level of confidence is, on average, 28.8 per 
cent (Figure 1, p. 20). We can also observe that 
Central and Eastern European countries present 
the lowest average, with a score of 13.4 per 
cent.  
 
In particular, we find 
decrease in the level of confidence over the last 
decade, especially since the 2006 elections, 
reaching the lowest score in May 2012 with 
only 4 per cent of positive evaluatio
other hand, the average confidence 
parties in Portugal stood at
the beginning of the 21st century, but in the 
following period it declined to 15 per cent. It is 
worth noting that also Greece displays a 
significant drop between 2009 and 2012. This 
corresponds to the emergence and deepening of 
the economic crisis, which led to the fall of the 
socialist government and the formation of the 
technocratic government led by Papademos
2011. However, this event should b
considered more as a catalyst than a causal 
factor of the decline because the negative trend 
had actually started in 
confidence in political parties in Spain seems
to be on an increasing trend
after that it follows a similar downward 
as that in the other Southern European 
countries.  
 
According to these findings, 
evidence that political parties in Southern 
Europe are experiencing a crisis among the 
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 until 2008, but 
trend 
there is clear 
 electorate. Western countries display short
term fluctuations in trust but during t
decade we can observe positive
trajectories. As Norris points 
change in European trust in political parties 
proved significantly positive during these 
years”16. On the other hand, desp
level of confidence, in Central and Eastern 
Europe there are less fluctuations. Therefore, 
growing negative sentiments towards parties is 
by no means a general phenomenon of 
contemporary democracies. Rather, it seems to 
concern specifically Southern Europe and it 
indicates a crisis of the role played by political 
parties in this particular region. Party failure 
seems particularly strong in Italy, and this may 
be associated with long-term attitudes of 
partyism” and the legacy of the crisis 
party system experienced during the 1990s
This phenomenon may represent an important 
clue for understanding the difference between 
the Portuguese and Italian elections, notably 
the significant party system transformation
took place in the latter case. 
 
Moving to the second indicator, we can 
observe that public confidence in national 
governments in Western and Southern Europe 
also displays clear, distinct patterns. While 
throughout Western Europe the 
positive evaluation presents a rela
pattern, in Southern Europe 
unequivocal decline since 2006 (
20). All countries affected by the economic 
crisis – including Ireland - present a negative 
trend. Again, it is worth noting that the 
                                                 
16
 Norris, P. (2011) Democratic Deficit
Cambridge University Press, p. 75. 
17
 Bardi, L. (1996) Anti-party sentiment and party 
system change in Italy, European Journal of
Research, 29 (3); Morlino, L. and M. Tarchi (1996) The 
dissatisfied society: The roots of political change in 
Italy, European Journal of Political Research
Mete, V. (2010) Four types of anti-
from the Italian case, Modern Italy, 15 (1).
-
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 Political 
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economic crisis is a catalyst of the decline in 
confidence, a deepening 
with the executive. In particular, the level of 
confidence in Italy drops between 2006 and 
2008, whereas there is a slight increase 
followed by stability – after the 2008 election. 
In Portugal – as well as in other Southern 
European countries – 
government falls gradually between 2006 and 
2012. In most countries there is a slight 
increase when national elections are held, but 
this is a short-term fluctuation which doe
undermine the long-term trend.
 
It is interesting to note that the level of 
dissatisfaction towards the government was 
lower in Italy than in Portugal during the 
period of the economic crisis. Despite the fact 
that the Portuguese government had to 
a bailout and had to face a worse
and financial situation, characterized by 
rates of unemployment and
deficit, the main political parties seemed to 
better resist the erosion of consensus and 
their popularity as a result of 
Italian voters show more negative and 
intransigent attitudes towards the incumbents, 
even after Berlusconi’s resignation.
 
The electoral campaign: leaders and issues
The analysis so far has emphasised the 
negative background conditions experienced 
by political parties – especially incumbents 
in Southern Europe. We have also pointed out 
that there are important similarities between 
the Portuguese and Italian case
long-term political attitudes. 
look at the campaign contexts, we find striking 
differences between the two countries. In the 
following section, we aim to characterise the 
main features of the electoral contest, focusing 
particularly on the main is
party leaders’ popularity.
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 The context in which the Portuguese electoral 
campaign took place was characterised by the 
deepening of the economic and financial 
situation, which led to the negotiation
troika18. After the resignation of the PM José 
Sócrates (March 2011), the interest 
public bonds rose well above 7 per cent, a 
threshold that, according to many observers, 
makes debt obligations impossible to meet. As 
a consequence, in April 2011 the socialist 
government officially asked for a 
which was supported by the main Portuguese
parties (the PS, PSD and CDS
May.  Inevitably this became one of the main 
issues which dominated the successive 
electoral campaign. 
 
It is worth emphasizing that the incum
socialist government had to face an 
unprecedented deterioration of the economic 
situation. The unemployment rate 
from 7.6 per cent to 11 per cent between 2005 
and 2011, whereas the government deficit wen
from 3.6 per cent in 2008 to 10.2 pe
2009 (9.8 per cent in 2010). On the other hand, 
public debt grew over the six years of
governments, from 71 per cent of GDP 
to 108.1 per cent in 2011. 
 
This political and economic situation 
resembled very closely the context of 
Irish campaign, where the incumbent Fianna 
Fáil lost 24 percentage points and suddenly 
became the third party19. Acco
previous research, economic performance is 
crucial for understanding voting choice in 
Portugal20. Many scholars have pointed out 
                                                 
18
 Troika consists of the Commission, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). 
19
 Little, C. (2011) The General Election of 2011 in the 
Republic of Ireland: All Changed Utterly?, 
European Politics 34 (6), 1304-13. 
20
 Freire, A. (2001) Modelos de comportamento 
eleitoral. Oeiras: Celta; Freire, A. and M. Costa Lobo 
s with the 
rate of 
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-PP) in early 
bent 
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t 
r cent in 
 socialist 
in 2005 
the 2010 
rding to 
West 
that electoral accountability in Portugal has 
always been very high, especially due to the 
competition between the two main parties, 
which has made it easy for voters to punish (or 
reward) the incumbent. In other words, 
retrospective voting has been a powerful 
instrument that has allowed the electorate to 
express their dissatisfaction and to foster 
alternation in government.
Given this background, it is not surprising that 
the electoral campaign focused mainly on 
socio-economic issues, 
polarisation between the two main parties. In 
particular, two aspects dominated the debate 
and the agenda of the 2011 campaign. 
crucial issue was about who should bear
responsibility for the worsening economic 
situation. In this case, it was clear that the 
majority of voters believe
government was mainly
economic turmoil. At the same time
main parties competed among themselves in
presenting the less painful solution for solving 
the economic problems and 
public finances. While the PSD aimed to 
implement a liberal revolution by reducing 
state obligations and stimulating civil society 
dynamism, the socialists support
of the welfare state and the maintenan
social policies. This strategy aimed to shift the 
attention of voters on issues that were 
traditionally at the core of the socialist 
programmatic stances21, 
being that of reducing their almost inevitable 
electoral defeat.  
                                                                             
(2005) "Economics, Ideology and Vote: Southern 
Europe, 1985-2000." European Journal of Political 
Research 44 (4); Lobo, M. Costa, and Pedro Ma
eds. (2009) As Eleições Legislativas e Presidenciais, 
2005-2006. Lisboa: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais.
21
 Guedes, N. (2012) Convergência ideológica? Uma 
análise comparada dos programas eleitorais do PS e do 
PSD (1991-2009)" Sociologia, Problemas e 
pp.103-25. 
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 The Italian electoral campaign took place in a 
characteristically different context. Although 
the worsening economic conditions and the 
austerity measures implemented by the Monti 
government were important, overall they 
played a minor role when compared to other 
non-economic issues. In particular, the 
campaign was strongly dominated by the anti
establishment stance adopted 
notably the need to regenerate and replace the 
political elite and the privileges attributed to 
political parties. One of the main cam
issues centred on the abolishment of public 
funding for political parties. In addition, the 
M5S adopted a populist rhetoric not only 
because of its anti-elitist message and the 
dyadic separation between “us
people” as well as references to 
elite”, but also because they defended a 
different concept of democracy based on direct 
participation by means of the widespread use
of Internet as a new tool for decision
and the rejection of any form of 
intermediation.22 
 
Related to the anti-establishment campaign 
adopted by the M5S, another important theme 
that dominated the pre-electoral period focused 
on the Monte dei Paschi affair which involved 
several bank managers in corruption
scandal exposed the links between politicians 
(mostly close to the PD) and the financial 
business, and diverted media attention to the 
“usual” practices of corruption and patronage, 
which had characterised the transition period 
between the First and the Second Republic. As 
a consequence, this scandal inc
populist appeal against the political elite and 
eroded the popularity of the main centre left 
party, especially in its strongholds, with an 
                                                 
22
 Bordignon, F. and L. Ceccarini (2013) "Five Stars and 
a Cricket. Beppe Grillo Shakes Italian Politics." 
European Society and Politics
DOI:10.1080/13608746.2013.775720. 
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paign 
” and “the 
“them-the 
 
-making 
. This 
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South 
 
important demobilisation effect among its 
party loyalists.  
 
Another important campaign
the financial reforms proposed by the main 
political forces, in particular the idea launched 
by Berlusconi to abolish the municipal 
property tax (IMU), which was introduced by 
the Monti government. Although we cannot 
establish the precise impac
the final electoral results, it is true that after 
this announcement the campaign of the centre 
right started to gain “momentum”, both in 
terms of mobilisation and voting choice 
(Figure 3, p. 21). At the same time, 
lead on the centre-right coalition declined 
throughout the campaign. Meanwhile, 
was extremely successful 
voters and in gaining support among different 
groups of voters. Finally, the new 
party led by the PM Mario Monti 
maintain its support in the last phases of the 
campaign. 
 
The last aspect to consider is related to the 
popularity of party leaders. Here we found that 
in the Portuguese case the socialist leader 
displayed the lowest score of positive feelings 
among the electorate, with an average of 20 per 
cent of support (Figure 4
hand, the CDS-PP leader experienced a 
significant increase in popularity 
months of the campaign. It is worth noting that 
the main opposition leader, Passos Coe
relatively low in popularity, with an average 
score of 30 per cent, which was very close to 
the popularity of the two radical left leaders 
(28.4 per cent for the PCP and 27.9 per cent for 
the BE). However, if we take into account the 
balance between positive and negative feelings, 
the findings show that all leaders were 
relatively unpopular23. 
                                                
23
 According to the data collected by Marktest in April 
2011, the balance between negative and positive feelings 
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 opinion surveys, when asked about their 
feelings towards party leaders, the majority of 
voters have a negative image of the main 
political actors. All the main party leaders 
showed a negative balance, especially the 
socialist PM who experienced a sudden loss of 
popularity with a decline of 40 
points in terms of positive evaluation in 
between March and  April 2011. 
 
The popularity of party leaders in the Italian 
campaign shows an ambiguous scenario. While
Berlusconi was clearly the least
only 22 per cent of positive feelings, the centre 
left leader showed the highest level of 
popularity with 44 per cent24
probably the result of two important 
phenomena. On the one hand, the PD leader 
Mr Bersani benefited from the primaries of the 
centre left held in November 2012, which 
projected the image of unity and cohesion of 
the coalition and increased his le
the other hand, until January 2013 there was 
uncertainty in the centre right coalition on 
whether Mr Berlusconi would run for 
leadership. A long debate about 
of holding primaries – which at the end did not 
materialize – did not help raise th
of the main party leaders. 
 
The incumbent PM Mario Monti 
relatively high score (33 per cent), 
very close to the popularity of Beppe Grillo (31 
per cent). Therefore, the data indicate
pattern between incumbent and opposition 
                                                                             
was -47 percentage points for Sócrates and 
Passos Coelho. Also the radical left leaders displayed a 
negative balance (-18 and -22 for Jerónimo de Sousa and 
Louçã, respectively), while the less negative feeling was 
achieved by Paulo Portas with -7 percentage points. The 
surveys ask voters whether they evaluate the 
performance of political leaders positively or negatively. 
The balance subtracts negative evaluations from positive 
ones, weighting for the number of responses.
24
 See IPSOS poll, released on 8 February 2013 (data 
available on www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it
percentage 
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parties. Despite this, when 
who was the leader who inspired
confidence, the available data indica
third of them had no confidence in any party 
leader25. Overall, these findi
important points. First, Bersani displayed 
higher scores of positive evaluations compared 
to other party leaders, even if there was no
much enthusiasm about his
there were no significant differences in terms 
of popularity between incumbent and 
opposition leaders. Last but not least, a 
consistent group of voters did not display any 
particular sympathy towards party leaders.
 
How can leader evaluation account for the 
different outcomes of the Italian and 
Portuguese elections? We believe that the 
Portuguese case was a clear example of strong 
anti-incumbent sentiments, where the rejection 
of the Prime Minister did not lead to 
support for the main opposition leader, but 
an important reason for voters 
the PS. On the other hand, the Italian case 
shows that there was a significant amount of 
ambiguity in terms of leader evaluation, not 
only because many voters did not support any 
party leader, but also because there were 
minimal differences between the p
the main political parties. As a consequence, 
these findings suggest that the clarity of 
accountability was higher in the Portuguese 
case, while Italy displayed a more blurred and 
uncertain situation.  
 
The electoral contest 
 
The goal of this section 
divergent poll results in the two countries by 
exploring the impact of factors such as the 
electoral offer (the creation of pre
                                                
25
 For further details, see the data collected between 
January and Februa
www.sondaggipoliticoelettorali.it
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 coalitions) and the reaction of voters to parties’ 
strategic choices.  
 
Italy has exhibited a lower 
institutionalisation of the political offer in the 
last two decades than Portugal. As emphasised 
by Di Virgilio, from this perspective the Italian 
case can be assimilated more 
experiences of new democracies in Eastern 
Europe, characterised by so-called “floating 
systems of parties” than to more stable systems 
working in geographically closer
European countries.26 In part, this can be 
attributed to the two (1993 and 2005) changes 
in the electoral system, which forced 
(both the main and smaller competitors) to 
periodically review their electoral strategies 
and alliances. For instance, the in
a majority prize in the 2005 reform, at least 
initially, generated strong incentives for the 
two major parties to invest in the creation of 
large pre-electoral coalitions to win the relative 
majority among voters.27 On the contrary, 
electoral rules were kept intact in Portugal 
since 1975 despite much talk on the need of 
reform.28   
 
In part, what changed is the way
have been interpreted and exploited by party 
leaders. Also from this perspective, Italy 
experienced more fluidity in the last decade. 
Whereas in 2006, the two major parties opted 
                                                 
26
 Di Virgilio, A. (2010) “Cambiare Strategia a Regole 
Invariate. La Rivoluzione Dell’offerta”, in R. 
D’Alimonte and A, Chiaramonte (eds.), 
se vi pare, Bologna, Il Mulino, p.73; Rose, R. and 
Munro N. (2009) Parties and Elections in New 
European Democracies, European Consortium for 
Political Research. 
27
 Chiaramonte, A. (2007) “Il Nuovo Sistema Partitico 
Italiano Tra Bipolarismo e Frammentazione”
D’Alimonte and A, Chiaramonte (eds.), 
ma non solo. Le elezioni politiche del 2006
Mulino, pp. 369–406. 
28
 Freire, A. and Meirinho, M. (2012) “Institutional 
Reform in Portugal: From the Perspective of Deputies 
and Voters Perspectives”, Pôle Sud, 36(1), pp. 107
level of 
to the 
, Western 
parties 
troduction of 
 existing rules 
Proporzionale 
, in R. 
Proporzionale 
, Bologna, Il 
–125. 
for the creation of over
cartels, in 2008 they chose to run 
winning coalition” alliances.
simplified electoral offer consisting in two 
different coalitions – the PD plus IDV on the 
left and the PDL and Northern League on the 
right – and two parties running alone: the mo
radical Rainbow Left and the Christian 
Democrat UDC.30  
 
On the Portuguese side, strategic
been less dramatic. The convincing 
the PS in 2005 (its best result ever in national 
parliamentary elections) allowed
Socrates to run a single
government. In 2009, the PS managed to grasp 
a narrow-margin victory, by “losing votes to 
the small parties while minimising losses to the 
main opposition party”.31
alliances were formed, partly because th
electoral system created low incentives to 
follow this path, and partly because of the 
                                                
29
 Chiaramonte, A. (2010) “Dal Bipolarismo 
Frammentato Al Bipolarismo Limitato? Evoluzione Del 
Sistema Partitico Italiano, in R. D’Alimonte and A, 
Chiaramonte (eds.), Proporzionale se vi pare
Il Mulino, pp. 203–28. 
30
 The Italian elections of 2008 will be remembered for 
the prominent impact of party strategic alignment on 
electoral results (Di Virgilio 2010). 
than-convincing 2006 election success, the two major 
center-left parties composing the fragmented Olive Tree 
Coalition decided to merge and create the Democratic 
Party. Furthermore, taking what can be described as a 
momentous decision, the new
secretary, Walter Veltroni, opted for excluding the 
radical left from the pre-electoral coalition agreement, 
thereby ending the decade-
which had survived the last three elections. These 
choices induced Berlusconi to reshuffle the alliances in 
his own camp. First, he inaugurated a common list, the 
People of Liberty, uniting his party, Forza Italia, and its 
traditional partner on the right, National Alliance. 
Secondly, he revised his partnership with the riotous 
Union of Centrist Christian Democrats and opened his 
coalition to the Northern League.
31
 Lisi, M. (2010) “The Renewal of the Socialist 
Majority: The 2009 Portuguese Legislative Elections”, 
West European Politics, 33(2), pp. 381
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 reluctance of left-wing parties to 
with the PS.32 
 
The different recent trajectories of the two 
party systems can also be captured through 
traditional indexes of party fragmentation. 
Portuguese elections before and during the 
crisis did not achieve a major overhaul of the 
party system. The effective number of parties 
(measured in terms of party vote, see Figure 
a/b, p. 22) marginally increased in 2009 due
the erosion of the Socialist Party’s electorate (
8.38 per cent) and the parallel marginal 
increase of support for the BE (+3.46 per cent) 
and the CDS-PP (+3.19 per cent). This entailed 
a relative decline in the vote for the two majo
parties (-8 per cent), which reached its peak in 
the 1987 elections. But the loss for the PS 
could actually have been more severe were it 
not for the Portuguese electoral system
this consists of a PR based on the 
applied in a number of small
constituencies, there is an inherent tendency
over-represent the biggest electoral
competitors. In the Italian case
point was the 2008 elections, and th
be imputed solely to the new electoral system
(modified, as already reported, in 2005)
already observed, in 2008 we assist
simplification of the electoral offer, which 
reflected itself in a lower effective number of 
parties and a higher proportion of votes 
directed to the two major parties. 
 
We contend that the fluidity in the party offer 
is one of the factors which undermined
level of loyalty and trust of Italian voters 
(especially young voters) towards the main 
political forces. More specifically, it did not 
create the conditions for a smooth
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of the accountability mechanism connecting 
governing elites and electors, whereby voters 
manage to confer a clear mandate and hold 
responsible the incumbent party/parties in 
government for the manner in which the 
country was governed. This should be 
conjunction with the recent emphasis on the 
importance of economic votin
countries most hard hit by the Eurocrisis
These dynamics contrast sharply with the 
stability of the party offer in Portugal 
the last decade, votes have t
mainly between the two main electoral 
competitors. Even when the executive had to 
rely on a coalition (2002
present), the attribution 
not affected “because one of the parties (PSD) 
was clearly dominant”.34
responsibility has been historically high in 
Portugal.35 Although 
warranted on this point, we argue that this 
attribute might have worked towards 
containing the protest vote and its dispersion 
towards third parties.  
 
Another dimension to consider is how voters 
responded to this variation in the electoral 
offer. The first factor to be analysed is the 
increase in voting abstention experienced by 
both countries. The first point is that the record 
of non-participation in legislative elections in 
the two countries has been historically 
different. From the post-war years to the end of 
the 1970s, the Italian abstention rate has been 
comparatively one of the lowest in the Western 
                                                
33
 See the Electoral Studies 
2012, 28 (2). 
34
 Freire, A. and Santana-Pereira, J. (2012) “Economic 
Voting in Portugal, 2002–2009”, 
31(3), p.510. 
35
 Van Der Brug, W., Van der Eijk, C. and Franklin M. 
(2007) The Economy and the Vote
Cambridge University Press. P.154
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 world.36 Conversely, Portugal has stood out for 
a relatively high expansion of the abstention 
rate since its first democratic election in 
1975, especially during the 1980s
In the last two elections, the percentage of 
those who did not vote climbed to 41.9 per cent 
in Portugal and 25 per cent in Italy. In both 
cases, the so-called “party of abstention”
up constituting the stronger “party” in the 
country.  
 
In Figure 6a and 6b (p. 23), the polynomial 
trend lines used to describe the fluctuation 
time in abstention rates, reveal the existence of 
different patterns. While in Italy
change approximates a linear trend, the 
Portuguese one increases exponentiall
beginning and then levels out in the last 
decade.38 While in both elections there was an 
increase in abstention, this was more 
accentuated in Italy: +5,5 per cent with respect 
to 2008.39 What is more, this increase might 
have been bigger were the 
occurring at the end of a full 5
and had there been no new political parties 
entering the competition with respect to 2009. 
We suggest that this result might be read in 
conjunction with the sharp decline 
Italian parties after 2010 reported in 
15 per cent between May 2010 and May 2012). 
In other words, the non-voting decision 
be associated with an increase in 
disaffection with party elites. Remarkably, this 
                                                 
36
 Tuorto, D. (2011) “La Partecipazione Al Voto”, in P. 
Bellucci and P. Segatti (eds.) Votare in Italia: 1968
2008, Bologna, Il Mulino, pp. 53–79. 
37
 Freire, A. and Magalhães, P. (2002)  “A Abstenção 
Eleitoral Em Portugal”, Lisbon, Imprensa de Ciências 
Sociais Lisbon. 
38
 In both cases, the recourse to a polynomial 
interpolation (n=2) yielded a slightly higher R square in 
comparison with the linear and logarithmic interpolation.
39
 This percentage corresponds to almost 2470000 voters 
not going to the poll, a figure which canno
by -3 per cent in the voting population (136000 voters).
April 
 and 1990s.37 
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does not appear to be the case in Portuga
where both the trust in political parties and the 
abstention rate are low and 
last decade. We suggest that given its
high level, the abstention 
conceived as an effective protest tool. Rather, 
people preferred to cast an invalid vote (
votes increased by almost 
2002 and 2011).  
 
The second factor of change is the increase in 
the level of electoral volatility. In Italy, the 
distribution of votes across party families 
(Figure 7, p. 24) during the 2006 elections still 
displayed a strong aggregation capacity around 
the centre left and centre right coalitions, 
respectively led by Romani Prodi and Silvio 
Berlusconi. This result was taken as evidence 
of the institutionalisation of a decade
process of bipolarisation of the Italian party 
system, the outcome of a process which started 
in 1994 with the inauguration of a new mixed 
electoral system. This tendency towards a 
simplification in the composition of the 
electorate survived the reint
system in 2006: in fact, 
strength after 2008 with
parliament, for the first time since the end of 
World War II, of the Communist Party. But, 
clearly, this trend was short
witness a substantial downsizing of the two 
traditional poles and the appearance of two 
new challengers: Lista Civica and 
defied Italian bipolar structure of party 
competition by running as outsiders 
main electoral cartels of the centre left 
centre right. The electoral alliance supporting 
Mario Monti gathered a heterogeneous list of 
centrist parties behind a largely liberal pro
European program. Th
outstanding: they obtained 
around 10 per cent of voters,
their coalition potential in the new parliament. 
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 On the other hand, the “movement” led by 
Grillo stood out for defiantly refusing to be 
categorized in a particular European political 
family. In a context as fluid as the Italian one 
in 2013, this represented an added value and 
contributed to its success. As revealed by post
electoral surveys published by the Cattaneo 
Research Institute in 2013, its 8 million votes 
were collected across the whole peninsula and 
from the whole political spectrum
support of both the former PD and Northern 
League voters in northern and central
while in the south it mainly gained followers 
among the centre right electorate.
it was successful among both far
radical-left voters. On the other hand, it is less 
clear whether it managed to rally support 
among citizens who decided not to vote in 
previous elections. This unforeseen catch
capacity signals that the vote for M5S was first 
and foremost a vote “against”
parties rather than a vote “for” a particular 
political project. 
 
Most importantly, it should be taken as 
evidence that the foundations of Italian politics 
entered a process of profound destabilisation 
after 2008, with almost one PDL voter out of 
two and one PD voter out of three not 
confirming their vote in 2013. In comparison, 
the electoral volatility exhibited 
less dramatic, with only a marginal increase in 
the last elections (Figure 8, p.
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Press release available at: 
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between two elections. Pedersen, Mo
“The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing 
Patterns of Electoral Volatility”, European Journal of 
Political Research, 7(1), pp. 1–26. 
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 It won the 
 of Italy, 
 Furthermore, 
-right and 
-all 
 mainstream 
re-
in Portugal is 
 24).41 In 
-
gens N. (1979) 
particular, smaller parties failed to attract 
unsatisfied voters who had previously voted for 
the two major parties. 
confirmed their incapacity to appeal to 
audiences than their traditional voters
greatest setback was in the B
faring surprisingly well in recent elections, it 
did not manage to retain its electoral base in 
2011 part of which opted for abstention.
 
Conclusions 
 
Portuguese and Italian voters woke up the 
morning after Election Day facing rather 
different scenarios. Portuguese polls brought 
no surprises: the incumbent lost to the main 
challenger. This was a classic case of 
alternation in government, where apparently
economic concerns extensively weighed on the 
decision of the PS electors to punish Socrates’ 
executive. Conversely, Italy experienced a 
political earthquake, whose magnitude can 
only be compared to that recorded during the 
political elections back in 1994
legislature promises to be nothing but a 
watershed in Italian politics. The party system 
shifted from a bipolar configuration to a 
tripolar (if not a quadripolar) one. The new and 
eclectic political movement led by Beppe 
Grillo, which up to then 
relatively recent local and regional elections, is 
now representing more than one fourth of 
voters at the national level. The goal of this 
working paper was to analyse the factors 
leading to the divergent poll results in the two 
countries. 
 
Starting from long-term factors
that the Italian political system has been 
traditionally characterised by a lower level of 
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 Magalhães, P. (2012), “After the Bailout: 
Responsibility, Policy, and Valence in the Portuguese 
Legislative Election of June 2011”, 
Society and Politics, 17(2), pp. 309
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 party institutionalisation than its Portuguese 
counterpart. In part, this has contributed to 
create a fertile ground for the intensification
anti-party sentiments43. Although the level of 
confidence in political parties is relatively low 
also in Portugal – as in other Southern 
European countries – compared to old Western 
democracies, populist or anti
forces are virtually absent and the main 
political parties seem to benefit from an 
important reservoir of popular consensus.
part, this undermined the formation of clear 
lines of accountability between governing 
elites and the electorate. In this sense
widespread distrust in political parties’ 
capacity to govern the economy in times of 
crisis was, if ever, strengthened by the period 
of technocratic government. The grand 
coalition sustaining the Monti government 
further blurred the division between 
and challenger, between who was responsible 
for leading the country into recession and 
alternative political forces. 
On the other hand, we must also take into 
consideration the short-term context in order to 
account for the different results of t
elections. The Portuguese campaign was 
clearly centred on the issue of responsibility: 
the incumbent PS tried to blame the PSD and 
its decision to reject the last austerity package 
for the worsening of the economic 
while the PSD focused its campaign on the 
PM’s incapability in managing the 
crisis. However, a very high proportion of 
voters believed that both the austerity measures 
and the bailout programme were inevitable 
order to solve the economic situation, thus 
                                                 
43
 In part, the transformation of the main political 
parties, notably their presidentialisation, which followed 
the emergence of Berlusconi’s Forza Italia and the 
attempt made by other parties – from both the left and 
the right – to imitate not only its hierarchical and leader
centred structure, but also its populist rhetoric, has 
certainly strengthened the appeal of anti
movements. 
 of 
-establishment 
 In 
, the 
incumbent 
he two 
situation, 
financial 
in 
-
-party 
placing the burden of responsibility on both 
mainstream parties. According to recent data 
published by Moury and 
approximately 57 per cent of voters consider
that the government was right to sign the 
bailout agreement.44 This may explain why 
radical left parties, unlike
not succeed in politicis
between those in favour and 
troika intervention. Although economic and 
financial issues have also played an important 
role in the Italian case, it was diffic
voters to use economic cues to evaluate the 
performance of either the main parties or the 
technocratic government. Rather, economic 
issues entered the campaign mainly as a 
component of prospective voting, which 
requires a lower degree of informatio
depends more heavily on leaders’ image and 
media discourse. This means that in the Italian 
case retrospective responsibility was blurred, 
thus reducing electoral accountability and the 
punishment-reward mechanisms.
Finally, the analysis of the 
electoral change points to three factors 
underlying the divergent electoral outcomes in 
the two countries. First, 
pointed out that the low institutionalisation of 
the political offer in Italy compared to Portugal 
might have contributed to obfuscate
of accountability between voters and 
representatives. Second, Italy had to face an 
unprecedented surge in abstention, whereas 
protest votes in Portugal were also channelle
through invalid votes. Third
in Portugal did not favour third parties, 
the anti-system stance 
managed to cast a wider net and fish for voters
from almost every political 
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(forthcoming). 
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 Figure 1. Confidence in political parties (2003
Source: Eurobarometer (2003-2012) 
 
 
Figure 2. Confidence in government in Southern Europe
Source: Eurobarometer (2003-2012) 
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 Figure 3. Vote share for the main Italian political parties according to opinion polls
Source: www.termometropolitico.it 
Note: data in the Figure show the trend in party support based on opinion polls between Januar
 
Figure 4. Leader popularity in Portugal (December 2010
Source: Marktest (http://www.marktest.com/wap/a/p/m~201106/s~6/id~e9.aspx
Note : the figure only displays positive evaluations of party leaders.
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 Figure 5a and 5b. Party fragmentation in Italy and Portugal
Source: ParlGov database. Döring, H., and Manow, P. (201
Infrastructure for Empirical Information on Parties, Elections and Governments in Modern Democracies. Version 12/10 
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 Figure 6a and 6b. Abstention rate and invalid votes in Italy and Portugal
Source: ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 201
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 Figure 7. Distribution of votes among political families in Italy and Portugal
Source: ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2012)
 
Figure 8. Electoral volatility in Portugal and Italy
Source: Portugal (own calculations), Italy. De Sio, L., Catald
Centro Italiano Studi Elettorali, http://cise.luiss.it/cise/2013/05/07/le
(September 28, 2013). 
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